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The growing threat of chemical, biological, and radiological (CBR) weapons to 
United States Navy ships and forces is addressed. Novel adaptations of existing weapons 
that enhance their lethality when used to deliver CBR payloads are discussed. A series of 
short scenarios describes how these new weapons might be used by an adversary in an 
extended campaign. Current naval warships are shown to be unable to· fight in CBR 
contaminated environments for periods of time longer than a day. They will be forced to 
withdraw from contaminated regions, undergo lengthy decontamination, and transit to 
uncontaminated regions to continue to fight. This is not consistent with the current 
operational concepts of Operational Maneuver From The Sea, indeed it is not consistent 
with any concept of successful conduct of littoral operations or modem power projection. 
Maintaining ship effectiveness in the face of these new threats requires changes to our 
basic warship design approach. A number of potential design changes are described that 
can help defeat this emerging threat and maintain aU. S. Navy· capable of fulfilling its 
power projection missions. 
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INTRODUCTION 
During most of the Cold War, the U.S. Navy pursued what has become known as 
the Maritime Strategy [1]-[3]. In this strategy most naval operations were envisioned to 
be blue water engagements between U. S. carrier battle groups and massed elements of 
the Soviet fleets. The chemical, biological, and radiological (CBR) threat was minimal. 
It consisted mainly of radioactive fallout from the unlikely use of torpedoes and/or 
antiship missiles with nuclear warheads and the possible use of a limited number of 
aircraft-delivered chemical or biological bombs that may have been carried on-board the 
"aircraft carriers" ofboth sides. In the author's knowledge neither side possessed naval 
gun ammunition or naval surface-to-surface missiles capable of dispersing CBR agents. 
In this CBR benign environment, emphasis on CBR defense was understandably 
relatively weak. Collective protection systems of some form were incorporated into most 
combatants, radiac (radiation detection, indication, and computation) systems (and later 
chemical detection sensors) were installed on the weather decks, countermeasure 
washdown systems were installed to minimize exterior contamination, and personal 
protective equipment was provided [4]. These were reasonably prudent precautions to 
take against the nuclear fallout threat and provided some protection against chemical and 
biological threats. Non-combatants (support ships) received little attention regarding 
CBR defense. 
In general, fleet operational doctrine envisioned that upon detection of an attack 
(a problematic issue even today with respect to biological agents), the collective 
protection (CP) system would be sealed and the countermeasure washdown system would 
be activated. The collective protection system isolates the crew from the agent and the 
washdown system washes much of the agent aerosol and vapor out of the air before the 
ship is contaminated and partially cleans and decontaminates the hull, deck, and 
deckhouse exteriors with sea water. The ship would then sail into uncontaminated 
waters, where crewmembers in personal protective equipment would exit the CP system 
to complete the decontamination process. 
When Coalition forces invaded Iraq during the 1991 Persian GulfWar, we found 
a nation with chemical, biological, and nuclear weapon capabilities far beyond those 
imagined by the intelligence community and with a leader that had proven his willingness 
to use such weapons. It was perhaps only sub rosa threats ofU. S. nuclear retaliation that 
prevented Saddam Hussein from using chemical and biological weapons on a scale not 
seen since World War I. Furthermore, a substantial portion of our naval forces were 
stationed within missile and aircraft range of Iraqi soil. Had Saddam used chemical 
weapons against our naval forces, we might have found out that our blue water doctrine 
imposes a number of limitations that would prove to be unacceptable. A study conducted 
by Chekan in the aftermath of the Gulf War concluded that neither the Navy nor the 
Marines were truly ready to fight in any CBR-contaminated environment [5] for even 
short periods of time. On a positive note, the study concluded that existing development 
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programs would significantly alleviate deficiencies in personal protective equipment and 
detection systems when they transitioned to production in a few years. 
The present study goes much further. It considers a wider range of operations and 
operations over extended periods of time. We conclude that our naval forces are not 
capable of conducting continuous power projection operations in a CBR-contaminated 
environment. Should an adversary decide to conduct high-intensity CBR warfare in the 
littorals, our forces will either have to retreat or pay a heavy price in casualties. Such 
controversial statements deserve further justification. That justification is contained in 
the next three sections of this document. The concluding sections address how we might 
remediate the shortcomings we have identified. 
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EMERGING THREATS 
The threat to U. S. forces is changing and will continue to evolve for the next few 
decades. First, proliferation is rampant. Despite worldwide bans on chemical [ 6] and 
biological weapons [7], more and more countries have developed or are attempting to 
develop such weapons. According to the author's estimates (based on unclassified 
sources), 13 countries are believed to have successful offensive chemical weapons 
programs and 14 more may have unreported programs attempting to develop such 
weapons. Another 13 countries (not exactly the same as the 13 for chemical weapons) 
are believed to have viable offensive biological weapons programs and 6 more may have 
unreported development programs. More than two dozen other countries possess the 
technical capabilities to rapidly develop and deploy offensive chemical and biological 
weapons should they desire. No country has been identified as actively attempting to 
develop offensive radiological weapons (radiation contamination weapons as opposed to 
nuclear explosive weapons). However, more than 75 countries possess one or more 
nuclear reactors (including research reactors), giving them an unqualified ability to make 
radiological weapons for large-scale military use. The military effectiveness of 
radiological weapons in harassing and terrorist roles (see below), and possibly in 
incapacitating and lethal roles as well, is seldom questioned. It seems unlikely that no 
one will pursue an effective weapon whose development is well within its capabilities. 
Note: unclassified governrnent estimates and estimates from arms control organizations 
of the number of countries pursuing CBR weapons do not differ significantly from the 
author's [8]. 
Often the proliferating countries attempt to hide their developments under the 
guise of dual use technologies. An organophosphorus pesticide plant may produce 
agricultural pesticides during weekdays (and whenever international inspectors come 
around), and within hours be converted to produce sarin or VX on the weekends. A 
pharmaceutical plant may culture genetically-altered insulin-producing bacteria during 
most of the year, yet culture botulinum toxin-producing bacteria during vacation periods. 
Alternatively, a large plant may produce both continuously, side by side, with only afew 
individuals in management knowing the truth. Without intrusive on-site inspections or 
well-placed human intelligence, it is virtually impossible to distinguish legitimate 
operations from military agent-production operations. 
Chemical, biological, and radiological weapons can be used in one or more of 
four different modes: lethal, incapacitating, harassing, and terrorist. The lethal mode 
requires agents capable ofkilling to be deployed in relatively large quantities. The aim is 
to kill as many of the targeted force as possible. The incapacitating mode employs either 
non-lethal agents in large quantities or lethal agents in relatively small, less-than-lethal 
quantities. The aim is to produce incapacitated forces, not dead forces. It is well known 
that an injured or sick soldier/sailor ties up far more resources for a much longer period 
of time (to tend to the wounds or treat the illness) than a dead one. Furthermore, as we 
shall see later, generation of fatalities may not fit the political agenda of the adversary. 
The harassing mode involves using very limited but detectable and physiologically 
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significant quantities of lethal or incapacitating agents. The aim is to force the targeted 
forces to assume a CBR protective posture (to avoid long-term exposure casualties) and 
consequently suffer the significant reduction in efficiency that invariably results from 
assuming that protective posture. Any casualties that result are usually incidental to 
assuming the CBR protective posture or caused by accidental local establishment of 
excessive agent concentrations. The terrorist mode of employment uses limited 
quantities of lethal agents deployed in limited areas to pro"duce lethal results. Often the 
targeted group is civilian personnel or the families of military personnel, rather than the 
military itsel£ The goal is to produce maximum casualties among the targeted group and 
instill terror in the general populace or raise questions among the military forces and/or 
general populace as to the wisdom of continuing the fight. 
If the adversary was fearful of a potential, unanswerable, massive U.S. retaliation 
with nuclear weapons, it might opt to employ less-than-lethal agents or sublethal 
concentrations of lethal agents. If few casualties actually die, the United States will find 
little justification to retaliate with nuclear weapons, no matter how widespread the CBR 
warfare becomes. It is possible that Saddam Hussein's failure to use his lethal chemical 
and biological weapons was due to a threat of U. S. nuclear retaliation. If, on the other 
hand, the adversary possessed its own substantial nuclear arsenal (a dozen deliverable 
warheads is probably sufficient), nuclear retaliation would not be a major concern, and 
the use of lethal agents in lethal quantities might be anticipated. The U. S. is loath to use 
nuclear weapons under any circumstance; it is extremely unlikely to use them first in a 
"mutually assured destruction" situation to punish an adversary's use of CBR weapons. 
It should be noted that since 1978 the official U. S. policy has been "The United States 
will not use nuclear weapons against any non-nuclear weapon state party to the NPT 
[Non-Proliferation Treaty] or any comparable internationally binding commitment not to 
acquire nuclear explosive devices, except in the case of an attack on the United States, its 
territories or armed forces, or its allies by such a state allied to a nuclear weapon state, or 
associated with a nuclear weapon state in carrying out or sustaining the attack." [9] The 
implications. of this policy are that lethal agents are more likely to be employed than less-
than-agents. 
Common lethal chemical agents used by many militaries include sarin (GB), VX, 
and mustard (HD). These agents have proven attractive to terrorists as well. In sublethal 
quantities these same agents can produce incapacitating or harassing effects. The non-
lethal agents BZ and CS can only be used in incapacitating or harassing modes. Common 
lethal biological agents include smallpox, anthrax, botulinum toxin, and plague. Less 
than lethal biological agents include cholera, Q fever, and staphylococcal enterotoxin B 
(SEB). Potential radiological agents include Cobalt-60, Strontium-90, and Cesium-13 7 
(potentially lethal in short duration, high dose rate exposures), and depleted uranium and 
plutonium (useful for harassing or terrorist actions because of their long-term 
carcinogenicity - they are not acute radiation threats). Many CBR agents can be 
modified to improve their "performance". For example, bacteria and viruses that do not 
survive long periods out of a human body can be microencapsulated to improve 
survivability. Chemical agents can be mixed with additives that make decontamination 
with water (including sea water and or bleach solutions) difficult. These additives 
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thicken the agent and make it "greasy" so that it repels water and sticks to surfaces. 
Radiological agents producing penetrating gamma rays can be mixed with quick setting 
adhesives (epoxies) so that they cannot be removed without special solvents or abrasive 
cleaning. Our adversaries know our standard defensive approaches and will conspire to 
make those approaches as ineffective as possible. 
Standard CBR weapons include aircraft-delivered bombs and aerosol sprays, 
ballistic missiles and rockets, artillery shells, and land mines. The artillery shells and 
land mines will concern the Marines ashore, but should not pose much threat to naval 
ships. The bombs and missiles may incorporate large tanks of agent with a central 
burster charge, or they may have an aerodynamic shell filled with small submunitions. 
The submunitions may detonate after a preset delay or upon impact. Standard agents 
without modifiers are the usual weapon fills. In general, our current protection systems 
were designed to counter single attacks with any of these conventional CBR :weapons. 
The only standard threat we cannot counter is the biological agent cloud dispensed at 
night from an aircraft many miles upwind from the naval targets, This last vulnerability 
results from poor detection capabilities against biological agents. 
Advanced CBR weapons can defeat many of our standard protective systems. 
Weapons can be designed to defeat the CP system. In a submunition, for example, 
combining shaped cutting charges for CP penetration with backblast shielding and a 
delayed burster charge would cause most of that submunition's agent to be dispensed 
inside the CP envelope. The external skin of a warship is seldom more than Yz-inch thick, 
although the Yz-inch plate is backed by a number of structural stiffening members. A 
linear shaped cutting charge roughly %-inch wide is easily capable of cutting through Yz-
inch steel. Such an approach could be incorporated into bombs, missiles, rockets, limpet 
mines, and even torpedoes, although large, high-speed projectiles could use kinetic 
energy alone to penetrate the skin. Alternatively, a CBR strike might follow hard on the 
heels of a conventional cruise missile or air strike. The follow-on strike assumes that the 
conventional strike will cause a significant amount ofbattle damage (i.e., penetrations of 
the CP citadels or severing ofwashdown piping) that the CBR strike can exploit. 
Mines can be designed to overcome the defensive systems by surprise. Consider 
a mine moored in shallow water (especially one in a region where mines are not 
expected). When the fuze on the mine detects the signature of a targeted ship class, it 
releases the buoyant warhead package. When the package broaches the surface, a small 
propellant charge ignites. This is similar to how a ballistic missile is launched from 
underwater, except that the propellant mechanism is more mortar-like than rocket-like. 
The warhead is propelled to a height of several hundred feet, where it gently explodes 
dispensing a number of submunitions that explode after a delay of one or two seconds. 
The result is a cloud of agent several hundred yards in diameter directly over the ship. 
Surface contamination will occur within ten seconds of propellant ignition. It is likely 
that the ship will be severely contaminated before any realistic alarm can be sounded, 
before the CP system can be buttoned up, and before the countermeasure washdown 
system can be activated. The agent chosen will be specially selected for its resistance to 
decontamination with seawater. 
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Another eventuality the Navy has not adequately considered is long-duration 
attack by CBR weapons. Our systems are designed to protect the forces for short periods 
until the ships could exit the contamination zones. Once the environment is clean, the 
ship's company can decontaminate the ship, and the ship can return to action. This 
assumes a traditional air or missile strike with chemical weapons. It also assumes that 
CBR weapons will be used on a sporadic basis. However, if the adversary can maintain a 
continuous attack with CBR agents, then our forces will not be able to decontaminate in a 
clean environment. If a ship sails far enough to escape from the contamination zone, it 
will be effectively out of combat for an extended period of time. A "mission kill" on a 
key target such as a ship is almost as good as a hard kill. It is not impossible to for a 
sizable adversary to continue a major CBR bombardment for several days or more. The 
United States amassed a chemical arsenal of 25,000 tons and the Soviet Union amassed 
one of 40,000 tons to be able to do just that [10]. A single attack involving 10 tons of 
agent could contaminate 100 square kilometers and maintain effective aerosol/vapor 
concentrations for up to an hour. Anyone with an arsenal of thousands of tons of agent 
could keep an area contaminated for weeks. Since a single "pesticide" plant may be 
capable of producing thousands of tons of agent per year, such an arsenal is well within 
the capability of many nations. 
Some individuals doubt the validity of a naval CBR threat far from shore. They 
suggest that if the adversary has gone to the trouble to reach out far enough to hit a ship 
with CBR agents, they would be smart to just sink the ship with an explosive warhead. 
There is some merit to this argument. However, explosive warheads are "point kill" 
devices; CBR weapons are "area kill" devices. An explosive warhead has to actually hit 
its target to have a significant effect. A CBR weapon spreads its agent over a large area. 
The high "lethality" of CBR agents means that only a small fraction of the total agent in a 
CBR warhead needs to actually hit the target. If a self-defense weapon intercepts a 
conventional missile outside of a reasonable "keep out" range, the threat is effectively 
eliminated. If a CBR missile is intercepted, the agent will still be dispersed (even if not 
optimally). The target ship or some other ship in the battle group may not be able to 
avoid the cloud of dispersed agent. Even if it hits the target, an explosive warhead may 
only damage the target, not destroy it. The explosive warhead of a small anti-ship cruise 
missile may destroy several compartments, yet not achieve a mission kill nor even any 
significant performance degradation. However, if a penetrating CBR warhead hits the 
ship, the ship will almost certainly be incapacitated for days, if not worse. As a result, 
one could expect CBR weapons to be more likely to hit their intended targets, require 
considerably larger self-defense "keep out" ranges, and be more likely to achieve mission 
kills. These facts suggest that an adversary willing to use CBR weapons may find them 
to be a better choice than conventional weapons, even in a blue water maritime situation. 
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CONSEQUENCES OF THESE "NEW" THREATS 
Let us examine some of the consequences of these new threats. Clearly, 
undetected biological agent attacks from distant aircraft will result in massive epidemics 
as soon as the incubation period of the infectious agent is finished. If lethal agents are 
employed, it is possible that the ship's company will be so decimated that operation of 
the ship is no longer possible. On-board medical facilities will be swamped within 
minutes of the first casualty showing serious symptoms. Lack of intensive care may 
cause many otherwise survivable cases to become fatal. Casualties will pile up so fast 
that the crew may be unable to dispose of the bodies. The breakdown in health care may 
cause many of those who failed to catch the primary infection to come down with 
infections from other diseases. If the attack was timed properly, the maximum number of 
dead and incapacitated will occur just as the ship is entering combat (presuming the onset 
of the "plague" did not cause the ship to divert for a friendly port. If contaminated with a 
particular virulent organism, it is debatable that the ship could ever be decontaminated 
sufficiently for a "friendly port" (including those in CONUS) to permit it to enter and the 
crew to debark. This last concern is sufficiently serious that it was explicitly voiced in 
the Chem-Bio 2010 Study [11]. 
In current ship designs, some ship's spaces must be open for them to function. 
Well decks, hangar decks, and cargo holds must be open to permit the operational 
movement ofboats, aircraft, or cargo. Such spaces will become contaminated if they are 
used. If contaminants don't directly enter the spaces, they will as contaminated boats, 
aircraft, and personnel enter those spaces. Once contaminated, the spaces will be almost 
impossible to completely decontaminate. The presence of contamination will force the 
crew and "passengers" to wear protective equipment degrading their performance 
significantly. Estimates of how strongly performance is affected depend on the ambient 
temperature. Tables of performance degradation can be found in the Army Field Manual, 
FM 3-7, NBC Field Handbook [12]. The contaminated equipment and cargo will require 
thorough decontamination before use. This may result in damage to sensitive equipment 
and possible disposal of uncleanable items. 
Weapons designed to penetrate the CP system have obvious effects. A typical CP 
system is designed to keep contaminants out of the protected zone. A mild positive 
pressure and airlocks prevent external contaminant from entering. However, inside the 
protected zone, air can flow from one compartment to another. If a quantity of agent is 
dispensed inside the protected zone, it will diffuse into many other protected 
compartments. The positive pressure may cause some of the contamination to be blown 
out of any external penetration, but not all of the agent will be eliminated in this fashion. 
Even though the protected zone has internal airtight doors that could be shut to minimize 
the diffusion of internal contamination, there are only a small number of airlocks. 
Shutting all airtight doors could trap portions of the crew and prevent them from 
performing their duties. At a minimum it would force personnel traffic patterns into 
inefficient ones. In large ships the CP system may be broken into a few independent 
zones. This improves the above situations, but does not eliminate them. 
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Any contamination internal to the CP system would likely take days to eliminate. 
Some electronic equipment may be virtually impossible to decontaminate without 
destroying the equipment. If the contaminated compartments contain such critical 
equipment, then some of the crew must wear personal protective equipment to operate or 
maintain it. 
A "continuous" CBR attack will lead to progressive contamination. New 
contaminants will continually enter both protected and unprotected zones with 
operational traffic, through malfunctions or damage, or simple leakage of the CP system 
at seals and joints. Each new incident of contamination will at best be partially 
remediated (decontaminated) if at all. More and more personnel will be forced to wear 
protective clothing. This clothing does not have an infinite operational life. In fact most 
protective clothing has a guaranteed operational life of less than 24 hours in a severe 
contamination environment. Some ensembles only have a six-hour operational life. 
Once the protective packaging of this protective clothing is opened, the clothing has a 
nominal 100-hour shelf life before it should be recycled. Filters in gas masks and 
ventilation systems must also be replaced regularly. As a result, on-board supplies of 
protective clothing, air filters, and decontamination gear will become depleted. Although 
some of the protective equipment can be regenerated by thorough decontamination, this 
takes time and further diminishes overall efficiency. The problem will tend to grow 
exponentially worse in time as the prolonged attacks continue. 
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EMPLOYMENT OF CBR WEAPONS AGAINST NAVAL FORCES 
How might an adversary operationally employ CBR weapons against our naval 
forces? Consider the following representative scenarios: 
Sl. At the outbreak of hostilities, the adversary takes the pre-emptive step of 
mining key ports used by the United States. As it sails out of the port, each of several 
dozen merchant ships opens a special compartment under the keel and dispenses three 
mines. One at a time the mines settle to the bottom. After a 12-hour delay, the fuzes on 
the mines become active. When they detect a warship or a merchant ship of a particular 
type they will fire. Instead of being loaded with conventional explosives, these mines are 
loaded with very persistent chemical agents. When the fuze detects an appropriate target, 
the mine propels itself to the surface and above where it explodes producing an agent 
cloud that contaminates the ship before protective measures can be taken. Once the ship 
is contaminated, activation of the washdown system (ifthere is one) will do little good as 
the agent contains a hydrophobic additive that repels the water spray just as grease 
would. Casualties on each "mined" ship will be severe (much more than if the ship had 
sunk in the harbor) and it will take many weeks to decontaminate the ship to safe levels. 
In all, the mining exercise effectively takes 3 tankers, 4 logistics ships, and 3 warships 
out of action before a general alert is put out. Traffic in an out of each port is halted for a 
week or more until the mines can be cleared. Two of the mine clearance vessels also 
become casualties of the mines. Loss of the tankers and logistics ships force a carrier 
battle group and an amphibious ready group to suspend transit operations for over a week 
until emergency resupply ships can be deployed. 
S2. At a number of U. S.-controlled ports, naval forces prepare for ultimate 
deployment to the area of conflict. At some of these ports, the adversary has deployed 
small terrorist (or special operations - the choice depends on your perspective) squads. 
Drawing on resources smuggled into the country months before hostilities begin, the 
squads proceed to sabotage operations. One group mounts an agricultural pesticide 
sprayer on a rented flatbed truck. After painting the logo of the company used to 
maintain the grounds of the base on the side of the truck, this group drives along the main 
access roads inside the Naval base and sprays approximately 300 gallon of mustard. 
Several hundred casualties result. More importantly, the base is closed for two days until 
the streets can be decontaminated. Preparation for deployment is delayed by the same 
amount. At a port facility another group using handheld sprayers filled with VX 
contaminates two warehouses of palletized stores. The decontamination process takes 
three days. Of more significance, the civilian longshoremen employed to load and 
unload the supply ships stage a walkout in fear of future chemical terrorism. 
Replacement of these personnel with recruits from a nearby Army training center takes 
two days to arrange. The inefficiency of the untrained "longshoremen" doubles the time 
it takes to prepare each ship and results in severe damage to several percent of the on-
loaded equipment. Supply ships average five days of additional turnaround time. This 
leads to severe shortages of some materials in the theater of operations. As an aircraft 
carrier at another port prepares to deploy, a third group flies a crop-dusting aircraft 
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upwind of the port and empties its spray tank of encapsulated Ebola virus. A week later, 
more than half of the personnel at the port, including a third of the crew of the carrier are 
confined to bed with severe fever, headaches, fatigue, and generalized hemorrhaging. 
Most will die. The deployment of the carrier is delayed for two months as the ship is 
decontaminated and a replacement Grew is assembled. At a major command center an 
attack, during the morning rush hour using several improvised Livens projectors (large-
bore chemical mortars) filled with VX projectiles, kills several hundred personnel and 
injures several hundred others. Included are the commanding officer, his deputy, and 
30% of the other senior staff. The center is closed for more than a day for 
decontamination. A repeat attack two days later kills the newly appointed replacement 
and another two hundred personnel. With scenes like the above replayed several times at 
each facility, the net effect is a reduction in deployed combat forces by 10%, an average 
three to five day additional delay in supply ships leaving port, and many thousands killed 
and ten of thousands sickened. 
83. A carrier battle group is responding to the first indications of an impending 
cns1s. It sails from its overseas base at best possible speed to the crisis area. With the 
carrier roughly 1000 miles from its destination, a small cargo aircraft sorties from an 
adversary airfield. The aircraft carries a 1 000-gal tank containing a biological agent. 
Spray nozzles are located every three feet along the trailing edges of the wings. Roughly 
100 miles upwind of the carrier battle group the aircraft begins to spray out agent at a 33-
gal/min rate. After three passes of 10 minutes each, an invisible cloud of agent has been 
formed that is 30 miles wide and several miles thick. Several hours later the 
unsuspecting battle group sails through the cloud. The aerosol-sensing biological agent 
detectors carried by the ships are turned offbecause they suffer from false alarms caused 
by sea spray. A day and a half after arriving on station, every ship in the battle group is 
seized by a massive epidemic. More than half the crew is deathly ill. Planned operations 
are suspended indefinitely. The small fraction of the crew that remains healthy is 
reduced to port and starboard watches and manning only the essential defensive and 
engineering systems. The CVBG has effectively been removed from the upcoming order 
of battle and left as a nearly defenseless invalid limping away from the likely field of 
battle. Fortunately, the first overt attacks do not occur until three days later, allowing the 
CVBG to escape from the killing ground. 
84. As follow-on forces begin to be staged, men and equipment pour onto one of 
our forward island bases (such as Diego Garcia or Guam). At the height of this buildup, 
the adversary launches 25 long-range ballistic missiles filled with persistent chemical 
agents. The speed of the incoming reentry vehicles is higher than that capable of being 
intercepted by our Theater Missile Defense systems. Under the ABM Treaty theater 
missile defenses are not allowed to have a capability to intercept ICBMs [13]. The 
incoming reentry vehicles deploy ballutes to slow down to hypersonic velocities and 
disperse their internal cargoes of bomb lets at 50,000 feet. At 1000 feet, the bomb lets 
explode spreading the chemical agent almost uniformly over the entire island. The 
population of the island base has adequate equipment and adequate warning to go to 
MOPP 4. However, the virtually impossibility of decontaminating the entire island 
means that the population will have to remain at MOPP 4 whenever they are outside of 
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improvised protective structures. It will take more than a month for the persistent agent 
to degrade to acceptable levels. Operations at the base slow to a crawl. Fear of 
contaminating precious heavy-lift aircraft forces alternative, more distant bases to be used 
for the troop buildup. Progressive contamination, equipment failures in collective 
protection enclosures, reduced sanitation, and contaminated health care facilities causes 
several hundred deaths and more than a thousand other casualties. 
SS. Early in the hostilities, an amphibious ready group (ARG), composed of three 
amphibious ships and six escorts, approaches one of the maritime choke points defining 
the adversary's denial area. The enemy has deployed several of its submarines in the 
approaches to the choke point. Although attack is imminent, no one suspects a chemical 
attack this far from the adversary's coasts. Two of the submarines each detect a separate 
outlying escort ship. They target each ship with two chemical warhead torpedoes. Once 
the initial charge penetrates the hull, the chemical fill is dispensed into the interior. The 
agent vaporizes and disperses throughout the ship. Many members of the damage control 
parties are immediately overcome. Only those with self-contained breathing apparatus or 
gas masks survive. The lack of anticipation of a chemical attack contributes to the small 
number of survivors. These few are unable to stop the flooding, fight the fires, or control 
the ship. Eventually, both of the targeted ships sinks. In the aftermath, the antisubmarine 
defenses eventually detect, localize, and destroy one of the adversary submarines but two 
others escape through the choke point. 
S6. As the diminished AR.G sails through the choke point, they are attacked by 
approximately 30 medium-range ballistic missiles. Theater missile defenses are able to 
destroy 20 of the incoming missiles, but 10 elude their interceptors. Although the ships 
are already buttoned up because of earlier chemical and biological attacks, it does them 
little good. At 30,000 feet, each surviving reentry vehicle dispenses 12 terminally-guided 
submunitions with hull-penetrating chemical warheads. Each submunition homes on the 
infrared contrast between the ships and the sea. Five of the seven ships in the AR.G are 
hit by an average of two submunitions. Two more distant ships survive intact. On the 
ships that are hit, the contamination is now inside the collective protection structure, 
where it spreads rapidly to all spaces. Chemical alarms sound and some of the crew are 
able to don personal protective equipment. However, there are only enough survivors to 
man bridge and engineering spaces. The decimated ARG is force to return to base and 
the planned buildup of forces in theater is derailed for two weeks. 
S7. After numerous delays and serious losses, the United States has finally 
amassed enough forces in theater to force their way ashore. Carrier aviation from 3 
CVBGs has established nominal air superiority over the intended landing area, although 
enemy strike aircraft are still present in large numbers and can deliver considerable 
ordnance in the process of suffering serious casualties. As the landing assaults begin 
from 3 AR.Gs and an MPF2010 MAGTF, a dozen strike aircraft attempt to deliver 
chemical bombs. Forty percent of the attackers are shot down before they reach the battle 
fleet. The remainder blankets the battle force with roughly 10,000 kg of persistent nerve 
agent. Thirty minutes later, land-based forces fire one hundred short-range missiles from 
multiple rocket launchers. These rockets spread an additional 2500 kg of hydrophobic-
17 
additive-doped mustard and 2500 kg of microencapsulated Ebola virus. Every 20-40 
minutes the attack is repeated in one form or another. Air strikes using bombs alternate 
with short-range missile attacks, medium-range missile attacks, cruise missile attacks, 
and attacks with drone aircraft carrying spray tanks. Roughly 2/3 of the attacks involve 
conventional explosive ordnance. However, the chemical and biological attacks occur 
with sufficient regularity to insure that the atmosphere around the battle fleet is severely 
contaminated around the clock. At the beginning of the attack all ships engage their 
countermeasure washdown systems and seal up their collective protection systems. 
Initially, this does much to protect the ships, but some of the superstnlcture is 
contaminated anyway as do any open cargo holds of the logistics ships accompanying the 
battle fleet. Unfortunately, many of the AAAVs, LCACs, lighters, V-22s, and other 
rotary wing aircraft become contaminated while transiting to and from the shore. After 
their return to their base ship, they cannot be completely decontaminated. The hangar 
decks, well decks, and cargo bays become increasingly contaminated. The conventional 
ordnance also has its effects. As soon as a ship suffers damage to its outer skin, the 
collective protection system no longer functions properly. Contamination builds up, 
casualties mount, and critical external repairs cannot be performed. Eventually the 
countermeasure washdown systems fail from corrosion or battle damage. Each failure 
and incidence ofbattle damage accelerates the contamination process. Ultimately, entire 
crews will be forced to wear MOPP 4 gear for 24 hours a day. Efficiency drops 
significantly and the ability to continue to support the forces ashore becomes 
questionable. After a few days, the reserves of fresh protective clothing and air filters are 
exhausted. Although the effects are not readily apparent to the adversary, nevertheless, 
the low-level chemical and biological bombardment continues relentlessly. Ultimately, 
neither the forces ashore nor the shipboard forces can function adequately to maintain the 
offensive. The forces ashore have to retreat and the entire fleet is forced to withdraw. 
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IMPLICATIONS FOR SIDP DESIGN 
The disasters predicted in the preceding section do not need to happen, even if the 
scenarios unfold as written. Combatant ships can be designed to be considerably more 
survivable to CBR threats. They can also be designed to permit near continuous 
operations even in a contaminated environment. Just because current design concepts do 
not admit solutions does not mean solutions are impossible. Currently unprotected 
spaces do not need to be unprotected simply because personnel and equipment must 
move in and out regularly. If CBR survivability becomes a dominant requirement (one of 
sufficient importance that it is weighed equally with other prominent requirements, such 
as signature reduction, payload, mobility, or cost), then innovative designers will invent 
solutions to even the most stressing problems. To date, CBR survivability has not been 
deemed sufficiently important. 
Although the author has not developed detailed designs or design guidelines, it is 
possible to list some of the design changes that need to occur. 
1. Design to reduce or prevent external contamination. 
a. Improved remote detection sensors for CBR agents need to be developed and 
deployed to provide 360-degree coverage around each ship. These sensors must 
have low probability of false alarms in the littoral and maritime environments. If 
the CBR agents are dispensed sufficiently far from the ship, then the early 
warning remote detection can provide may permit the ship to maneuver around 
the contamination. 
b. The countermeasure washdown system should be extended so that a ship's entire 
exterior surface (including the tops of all masts) is protected by its wall of mist 
action. 
c. Countermeasure washdown system nozzle location, spacing, and orientation 
should be determined to minimize gaps which can be created by wind or ship's 
motion. 
d. Except where flight operations safety might be adversely affected, the 
countermeasure washdown system should be automatically coupled to the CBR 
agent detection systems. 
2. Design for decontaminability. All spaces (exterior and interior) should be designed 
for maximum ease of decontamination. 
a. All equipment, including antennas, small boats, cargo handling rigging, underway 
replenishment equipment, even weapon launchers if possible should be located 
within the envelope of the hull and superstructure. Spaces occupied by these 
items should be protected by filtered, positive pressure air supply. 
b. Maintenance and access panels should be designed to form hermetic seals and to 
minimize cracks and crevices that can trap CBR agents. 
c. Surfaces should be smooth. Applied coatings (such as radar-absorbing material) 
should be seamless. The skin should be continuously welded or bonded to avoid 
cracks and crevices that can trap CBR agents. 
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d. Materials and coatings used anywhere where that contamination is likely should 
not absorb liquid chemical agents or their vapors. Chemical agent resistant 
coatings (CARC) should be used on all painted surfaces [14]. 
e. Lubricated bearings and rotary joints should not be used externally. 
f. New non-corrosive, non-toxic, decontaminating agents and sterilizing agents, that 
are at least as effective as DS2 and more effective than calcium hypochlorite 
(HTH), should be developed. The Army SBCCOM supports continuing- efforts to 
replace DS2 and HTH with one or more effective area decontaminating agents 
that are not toxic, will not degrade sensitive electronic parts and their coatings, 
and can kill bacterial spores rapidly. The navy should capitalize on their ultimate 
success. 
g. The countermeasure washdown system should be modified to permit external 
washdown using stored decontamination solutions as well as the usual seawater. 
3. CP design for damage resistance. The collective protection system needs to be 
designed so that it can sustain battle damage, i.e., penetration of the hull or 
superstructure and contamination of one or more interior spaces normally serviced by 
the CP system. The following items can contribute to this task: 
a. The hull, superstructure, and airtight zones should be armored with advanced 
composite and/or spaced armors to the maximum extent possible. This will not 
only minimize the potential for "penetrating" CBR weapons to successfully 
contaminate the interior spaces, but also will minimize the damage that any 
conventional weapons may inflict [15]. 
b. Clean, CBR-filtered air should be delivered to each compartment from ducting 
that has internal "valves" and path redundancy. Should the ducting be punctured, 
the damaged sections can be isolated from the system without impairing airflow 
to other compartments. 
c. Areas within the CP citadel need to be partitioned into a substantial number of 
airtight zones. Airlocks need to be located at all accesses between airtight zones. 
Note: large warships already have CP systems with a few independent zones 
(perhaps 6 to 8). However, the rationale for this is found more in limitations 
caused by requirements that ducting not cross fire bulkheads than in increased 
CBR survivability. For CBR survivability, we envision 4 to 8 zones on a small 
ship and dozens on a large ship. 
d. All airlocks should have some form of associated decontamination station, so that 
in the event of contamination of one zone, ingress and egress of personnel 
wearing protective equipment shall not be hampered. 
e. Portable emergency airlock kits (the Army already has equivalent systems for 
their portable emergency CP shelters) need to be developed to permit isolation of 
individual compartments to minimize spread of contamination during damage 
control and decontamination activities. 
f. Damage control stations should contain materials for making expedient repairs of 
punctures to the airtight compartments (this could be as simple as a viscous 
adhesive and flexible, polyethylene membranes. A spray foam sealant should be 
available to stop air leaks at junctions between potentially warped walls, decks, 
and ceilings and at compartment penetrations such as power and/or plumbing 
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conduits. In a CBR environment, patching holes in the CP shelter is almost as 
important as patching holes in the hull below the waterline. 
g. Interior damage control stations should be provided whose sole function is CP 
repair and maintenance. 
4. CP design to incorporate all ship's spaces. The important function of collective 
protection should be provided to all ship's spaces, including well decks, hangar 
decks, cargo holds, and machinery spaces, such as main propulsion. · This will permit 
continuous combat operations in a contaminated environment by removing current 
restrictions on ingress and egress. 
a. Large-scale airlocks/decontamination stations should be incorporated into designs 
at the points where vehicles, personnel, or cargo enter these spaces from the 
outside. They should be large enough to accommodate the largest vehicle or item 
normally handled in these spaces. Decontamination should be automatically 
activated and designed to take the shortest effective time to accomplish. 
b. Propulsion and/or power generation systems should draw their air through ducts 
directly connected to the ship's exterior. These ducts should not permit any air 
exchange with interior air. CBR-filtered air should be provided under positive 
pressure for the crew that normally inhabits these spaces. Intake ducts should be 
designed to be decontaminated prior to machinery repairs. The high temperatures 
of internal combustion engines or gas turbines will effectively decontaminate the 
exhaust ducts. 
5. Design for operability. All aspects of the ship should be designed to permit normal 
operations to be carried out even if the ship is in a contaminated environment. 
a. Airlocks should be designed for maximum personnel and equipment throughput 
with minimum acceptable cycle times. Airlock size should be commensurate with 
traffic. For example, airlocks on paths leading to the sickbay should be capable of 
accommodating a stretcher-borne casualty and two stretcher-bearers. 
b. Passageways should be oversized to permit two-way passage of individuals 
wearing protective clothing and possibly self-contained breathing units. 
c. External airlocks should be located so as to provide easy ingress and egress and 
smooth flow of personnel between exterior spaces and interior spaces as well as 
between different interior spaces, even if one or more airtight zones are 
permanently sealed because of contamination. 
d. Control stations should be standardized throughout the ship, accessible from a 
common ship-wide network, and configured entirely through software. Should a 
compartment containing a vital control station become contaminated, then it 
should be possible to reconfigure one of several planned spare control stations in 
another part of the ship to take over all functions of the contaminated station. 
e. Special facilities should be provided for the frequent, thorough decontamination 
and reconstitution of personnel protective clothing and masks. 
f. Quantities of protective equipment and decontamination agents carried on board 
should be sized for the continuous contamination environment, or provision 
should be made for these items to be resupplied on the same regular basis as fuel 
or ammunition. 
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Some of the design suggestions listed above will have little impact on total cost, 
ship size, and other measures of effectiveness. Some can be achieved simultaneously 
with achieving other desirable survivability features such as stealth or armor. Others will 
have significant impacts such as incorporating air locks into well decks. Clearly, cost and 
total operational effectiveness must be considered in the detailed design process. 
However, it does little good to have an inexpensive ship that cannot fulfill its mission. It 
also does little good to have ships that are very capable under one set of-circumstances 
yet are totally incapable under other circumstances that are under the enemy's control. 
Our continued failure to address the CBR threat in a satisfactory fashion begs the enemy 
to employ CBR against us. 
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IMPLICATIONS FOR THE REQillREMENTS SETTING PROCESS 
The sad state of affairs described in the preceding paragraphs must be addressed 
by recognizing the changing nature of the threat and by writing requirements documents 
that adequately address the new CBR threats. For example, in recent ship procurements, 
the Operational Requirements Documents (ORD) require the ships to "operate in a CBR 
environment". However, there is little definition as to what concentrations of what 
agents constitutes "a CBR environment". There is no definition of what constitutes 
"operation", how well that "operation" must he performed, and how long each ship must 
"operate" or even survive in a CBR environment. ORDs should he written to be more 
specific as to exactly what is required as far as CBR warfare is concerned. Specifically, 
they should explicitly require that all warships (including combat support ships) should 
be capable of performing all military operations without degradation in a continuously-
lethally-contaminated environment for a total period of at least 60 days, and at least 14 
days without requiring resupply ofCBR-related consumables. 
Other important guidance documents, the Required Operational Capabilities 
(ROC), seldom contain any statements beyond those explicitly requiring long-time 
standard measures: countermeasure washdown system, collective protection systems, 
protective clothing for the crew, decontamination equipment for the crew, CBR 
prophylaxis for the crew, emergency CBR medical care for casualties, and capabilities to 
detect (and preferably) identify the presence of contamination. Future ROCs for 
warships should at a minimum require the ship to be able to perform all of its primary 
assigned missions whether or not CBR contamination is present and regardless of if it is 
present for hours or days. When applicable, the ROCs already explicitly require certain 
warfare missions to be performed "in daytime or at night", "under EMCON conditions", 
'jointly with other units", "autonomously", and other specific conditions. The CBR 
environment should be handled similarly. Because all procurements are resource-
constrained, if there is no requirement for a capability, the designers/developers have 
little incentive to invent ways to provide that capability, and negative incentives to 
incorporate that capability into their design. 
The Chief of Naval Operations has assigned responsibility for CBR defense 
requirements liaison to N86DC, the Assistant for Ship Safety and Survivability [4]. In 
general, such a requirements setter genuinely attempts to adequately address the threat as 
it is presented to him/her. However, he/she can hardly be expert in every aspect of the 
relevant technologies, especially those that the U. S. has officially renounced, such as 
offensive CBR warfare. He/she is typically not educated in the social/economic/ political 
motivations of threat decision-makers, nor does he/she have access to all of the available 
intelligence data. Thus, he/she is rarely able to make more than a guess about the future 
course of threat developments. He is strongly reliant on intelligence estimates. Another 
problem is that ship development is not the sole province of N86. For example, 
amphibious ships are the responsibility of N85, who is apparently under no obligation to 
follow the recommendations made by N86DC. Unfortunately, these other requirements 
setters are much less likely to be thoroughly conversant with CBR warfare and its 
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ramifications than is N86DC. Thus, one part of the current shortcomings can be traced to 
the lack of a central authority for setting and enforcing CBR requirements. This problem 
could be easily solved by the creation of an independent "CBR czar" at the N8X level. 
However, a second big part of the problem can be traced back to threat 
determination and its communication to the requirements setters. The intelligence 
community has become averse to making mistakes of commission. \Vhen dealing with 
data derived mainly from National Technical Means it is easy to make mistakes of 
omission (failure to detect something new in overwhelming masses of data) and almost as 
easy to be forgiven those mistakes. However, to state that one has found something new, 
with the significant repercussions that implies, and later be proved wrong, is not easily 
forgiven. As a result, intelligence analysts are leery of sticking their necks out too far. 
Furthermore, intelligence analysts are generally· experts at how the threat 
develops, produces, and deploys new military hardware. A combination of observations 
from National Technical Means, open source data, and human intelligence provides the 
analyst with a picture of what items are in advanced development, what is undergoing 
testing, and what is being produced. Knowing how long it typically takes a system to 
progress from advanced development to test & evaluation to initial production to initial 
operational capability, analysts are good at projecting the current developmental activities 
into future deployed systems. However, this typically covers five to ten years into the 
future. To predict farther into the future requires knowledge of what the threat is thinking 
about that future. The systems that are still just engineering dreams are those that will 
enter development 10-15 years later and might become deployed systems 25-30 years 
later. Data to make this kind of prediction is almost never available to the intelligence 
analyst. This means that formal intelligence estimates become unreliable when 
predicting the deployed capabilities of an enemy 25 years into the future. They tend to 
grossly underestimate the enemy's capabilities. Yet long-term future threat estimates are 
just what are needed when designing ships that will still be operational 30-50 years from 
now. Intelligence analysts also appear to fail to take the reactive nature of an adversary 
into account. They project the threat based on what is happening now. They seldom do 
"what if' drills that ask what will changes will the adversary make to his forces, 
equipment, and force structures, when we make a decision to develop and deploy a new 
capability of our own. 
A different kind of intelligence estimate can be obtained from the technical 
community. This is known as the technologically feasible threat. A collection of highly 
skilled technologists, who have studied the state of the enemy's technology, can 
determine what it is technically possible for the enemy to achieve in a given time frame. 
They are also used to doing "what if' analyses. Because no one can predetermine what 
specific decisions threat developers will make, this kind of threat estimate is usually no 
more accurate in absolute terms than the formal intelligence estimate. Development 
problems, quality control defects, budgetary peculiarities, manpower shortages, changes 
in political policies, management conservatism, and other factors that significantly affect 
the pace of development are not major considerations in developing the technologically 
feasible threat. Thus, although inaccurate, it has the benefit of typically overestimating 
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the threat capabilities. From a survivability perspective, it is much better to use an 
overestimated threat than a grossly underestimated threat, though a balance is preferable. 
Closer cooperation between intelligence analysts, technology specialists, and 
political/economic country specialists could result in still better estimates. A 
technologically plausible threat could be developed that considered not only the 
technology possibilities and the developmental realities, but also the societal and 
governmental influences. Although revolutionary advances are still unlikely to be 
predicted, much better evolutionary predictions could be developed. Furthermore, 
revolutionary developments are incorporated into the plausible threat much faster than 
they are incorporated into traditional threat estimates. For example, within days of the 
announcement ofhigh-temperature superconductivity, weapons designers began to dream 
about what they could do in· ten years time when the materials would become more 
commonly available. Military systems based on a technologically plausible threat would 




The threat environment has changed dramatically since the collapse of the Soviet 
Union. Among the changes is that many new potential adversaries are on the horizon. 
Many of these new threats possess chemical, biological, and possibly even radiological 
weapons. Several countries have shown willingness to use CBR weapons in conflicts. 
Several potential adversaries possess or will possess nuclear arsenals that -can be used to 
stem the threat of U. S. nuclear retaliation if CBR weapons are used, even if we are 
willing to consider reneging on our promise to the world not to use nuclear weapons 
against non-nuclear weapon states. The threat of CBR weapons being used is and will be 
higher during the next few decades than it ever was during the Cold War. Furthermore, 
the U. S. Navy is not imtnune to the effects of these weapons. Potential adversaries can 
strike us with CBR weapons almost anywhere, in port, in transit, or in the theater of 
operations. New weapons will be developed which will defeat the limited capabilities of 
our current defensive systems. 
If the United States wishes to continue to be able to project power anywhere on 
the globe through its use of naval forces, then future warships must be able not only to 
survive the growing CBR threats but also be able to complete their missions in the 
presence of massive CBR contamination. This will require changes in design philosophy 
and well as potential changes in the requirements setting and threat definition processes. 
New, CBR-tolerant designs are possible. However, they will not happen until the 
Government demands that they happen. Failure to address this key issue will guarantee 
failures to perform in future crisis situations. 
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